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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdict'sn of this Court to hear this appeal is conrerred 
by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by Rule 
3 of the Ruies of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
I 5SUES 
1. A "pro se" cannot be held to the same stringent 
standards as a law-trained attorney. 
2. There was not sufficient evidence or "Practicing Medicine 
without a License to convict defendant. 
3. The "Medical Practice Act" does not apply to persons who 
practice the "healing arts." 
4-. Plaintiff was required to affirmatively prove that 
Defendant was outside the exceptions to tne criminal statute, 
given his religious ana other status in the community. 
5. Section UCA 56-12-30 is unconstitutionally overbroad ana 
unc1 ear. 
6. The trial Court erred in allowing inflammatory, 
prejudicial, irrelevant testimony to be introduced against the 
defendant. 
7. The denial of the Motion for New Trial, was an aouse or 
discretion by the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES 
"License-several classes-Definitions.--The 
following classes of licenses shall be 
1 
issued: 
vi; To Practice medicine and surgery in 
all Dranches thereof• 
<2) (a; To practice as an osteopathic 
physician without operative surgery in 
accordance with the tenets of a profession 
school of osteopathy recognized by tne 
aepartment or registration. 
(fo) To practice as an osteopathic 
physician ana surgeon in accordance with the 
tenets of a professional school of osteopathy 
recognized by the department or registration. 
(3) To practice the treatment of human 
ailments in accordance with the tenets of the 
professional school, college or institution 
recognized by the department of registration 
of which the applicant is a graduate as 
designated in his application for license, 
but without the use of drugs or medicine and 
without operative surgery. "Drugs and 
medicine" as used herein shall mean articles 
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease for wnicn an authorized prescription 
is required by law. Such articles shall not 
include devices or their component parts, 
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment or prevention for 
disease for which an authorized prescription 
is not required by law, 
(4) To practice the treatment of human 
ailments in accoraance with the tenets of the 
professional school, college or institution 
recognizea by the department of registration 
of which the applicant is a graduate as 
designated in his application for license, 
including the practice of obstetrics and tne 
use or drugs ana medicine, but without 
operative surgery, except operative minor 
surgery. The term "operative minor surgery" 
means the use of electrical or other methods 
of the surgical repair and care incident 
thereto of superficial laceration and 
abrasion, oenign superficial lesions and the 
removal of foreign bodies located in the 
superficial structures; and the use of 
antiseptics and local anesthetics in 
connection therewith but it shall not include 
any surgery which requires blood transfusion 
or the entry into the abdominal or thoracic 
cavity or cranium. 
K5) T O practice obstetrics if a valid 
2 
oostetrics license has been issued ana is in 
rorce prior to the effective date of this act 
for sucn practice." 
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-3 (1953; as amended (emphasis added) 
w
'Practicing medicine" der ined-Except ions.--
Any person who shall diagnose, treat or 
profess to treat or prescribe or advise for, 
any physical or mental ailment of, or any 
physical injury to, or any deformity of, 
another: or who shall operate upon another 
for any ailment, injury or deformity, shall 
be regarded as practicing medicine or 
treating human ailments. But nothing in this 
section shall be construed to include the 
foil owing cases: 
<, 1 > The administration of domestic or family 
remedies in case of emergency. * * * 
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-17 (1953) as amended (emphasis added) 
Medical Practice Act-Definitions--As used in 
this act, suolect to the exemptions or 
section 56-12-29:* * * 
^2) The word 'diagnose' means to examine 
in any manner another person, parts of a 
person's body, substance, riuids, or 
materials excreted, taken or removed from a 
person's body, or produce by a person's body, 
to determine the source nature, kind or 
extent or a disease or other physical or 
mental condition, or to attempt to so examine 
or to determine, or to hold oneself out or 
represent that an examination or 
determination is being made or to make an 
examination or determination upon or from 
information supplied directly or indirectly 
by another person, whether or not in tne 
presence of the person making or attempting 
the diagnosis. 
v3) The words "drugs or medicine" mean 
articles, chemicals or compounds or 
biological preparations intended tor internal 
or external use by man or intended to be used 
for diagnosis, cure, mitigation or prevention 
of diseases or abnormalities of man as 
recognized in any published United States 
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary, or 
otherwise established as a arug or medicine. 
(4) The words "practice of medicine'1 
mean: 
u ) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise 
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or prescribe for any human disease, ailment* 
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other 
condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary, by means or instrumentality: 
(b) To maintain an office or place of 
business for the purpose of doing any of the 
acts described in subsection (a) whether or 
not for compensation; 
(c) to use, in the conduct of any 
occupation or profession pertaining to the 
diagnosis or treatment of human diseases or 
conditions in any printed material, 
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs, 
advertisements the designation "doctor," 
"doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon," 
"physician or surgeon," "Dr.," "M*D." or any 
combination, of these designation, uniess the 
designation additionally contains the 
description of the oranch of the healing arts 
for which the person has a license." 
Utah Code Annotated 56-12-28 (1953) as amended vempnasis added) 
Medical Practice Act-Practice of medicine 
without a license a Felony-Exceptions. 
"It is uniawrui to engage in the practice or 
medicine in this state without firs obtaining 
a license. Any person who engages in the 
practice of medicine without a license is 
guilty of a felony; except the rollowing 
persons may engage in activities included in 
the practice or medicine suoiect to the 
circumstance and limitations stated: * * » 
(^ ) any individual rendering aid in an 
emergency, when no fee or other consideration 
of value ror the service is contemplated, 
charged or received; 
<5> any individual administering a 
domestic or family remedy including those 
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, 
health ror or health food supplements, herb 
or other products of nature, except drugs or 
medicines for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law; 
(6) a person engaged in good faith in 
the practice or the religious tenets or any 
church or religious belief without the use of 
any drugs or medicines ror which an 
authorized prescription is required by law;* 
* *" 
Utah Code Annotated 56-12-30 (1953) as amended (emphasis added) 
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"M^dioal Practice Act-Scop« of aot.-This 
chapter is designed solely for the regulation 
of the practice or medicine and does not 
apply to the regulation of * * *the healing 
arts, * * * and this act shall not change or 
limit the rights or persons lawfully 
practicing the otner healing arts with 
respect to the practice of their professions 
* * *
tf 
Utan Ooae Annotated 56-12-56 t, 1953 J as amended lemphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature or Case 
This appeal is taken rrom a Judgment or Criminal 
Conviction, in which the defendant, Stanley Maistrom, was 
Convicted of a Third Degree Felony, "Practicing Medicine without 
a License". 
Proceedings 
1. Trial of this matter was heard on August 31, 1989, at 
which time judgment of conviction was enterea. 
2. Motion for New Trial was filed on October 9, 1969. 
3. Said Motion was denied on October 24, 1969, at which 
time defendant was sentenced. 
4. Notice of Appeal was riled on November 22, 1969. 
5. No previous or other appeal has been filed or heard in 
this matter. 
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FACTS 
i. Stanley Malstrom is an herbalist, and an acupressurist, 
who practices tenets of the L.D.S. religion, specifically as it 
relates to the Word or Wisdom, 
2. On or about October 29, 1989, Carol Marshali, came to 
Mr. Maistrom's home, complaining or digestive problems. This 
visit was arranged through friends of Mr. Malstrom's, the 
Tishner's, and her husband, and was at the special request or 
same. 
3. Complainant, Ms. Marshall, told Mr. Malstrom or her 
troubles and requested that he lay his hands on her. 
4. Mr. Maistrom, did perform the service, ana suggested to 
Ms. Marshall that she might be better off with an improved diet 
and a "green drink" (a mixture of vegetables, and pineapple 
known to many as a soothing substance for the digestive system). 
5. Ms. Marshall never paid for any or the above services, 
nor were any drugs, prescribed, although sne was told by Mr. 
Malstrom, at one point that she may have a sinus infection, and 
she should see her physician. 
6. Subsequent to her visit to Mr. Maistrom, Ms. Marshall 
filed a Civil suit against him alleging that he had damaged 
fusion in her vertebrae, which action has not, to date, been 
tried, nor judgment entered. 
7. On or about March 29, 1959 the State of Utah filed 
charges against Mr. Malstrom alleging "Practicing Medicine 
without a License", in which the civil Plaintiff, Carol Marshall 
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was the complainant. 
6. Mr. Maistrom appeared "pro se" at his trial on August 
31, 1989, and was convicted of the charge. 
9. Subsequent to the trial, Mr. Maistrom retained Robert 
Macri as an attorney, and Mr. Maori filed a Motion for New Trial 
on October 9, 1989. 
10. Hearing on tne Motion for New Trial was heard on 
October 2^, 1989, which motion was denied, and Mr. Maistrom 
sentenced. 
11. Due to problems in communication, Macri, has since 
withdrawn, leaving Maistrom to pursue this case "pro ser. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State argues that the exceptions contained in the 
various sections or the "Medical Practice Act" are merely 
affirmative defenses and not elements of proof which the state 
must establish; and further that the state need not prove ail 
elements of the case in order to sustain conviction, and yet even 
the trial Court recognized the State's need to establish just 
these things. Not only were there elements of the charge to 
which no evidence was present or established the State railed to 
show that the exceptions did not apply. 
Maistrom was not required to show case iaw to support his 
claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, a simple showing or the applications which might be 
construed; under the instant application, is sufficient. 
The State further ignores the fact that due to the 
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irrelevant testimony allowed to be entered in the trial Court, 
the Court overlooked the unreliability of lis. Marshall's 
testimony. 
Furthermore, "pro se's" cannot be held as strictly 
knowledgeable in Courtroom procedure. It is true that they must 
make the proper objections ana file the appropriate papers (whic 
Malstrom did throughout;, the Court must extend "reasonable 
consideration" to his acts. 
ARGUMENT 
A "pro se" cannot be held to the same stringent 
standards as a law-trained attorney. 
As the State notes in its brief «,page 11.) the doctrine 
establishea in Nelson v Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207. 1213 ^Utah 
1953), that the Court is expected to extend a little extra 
consideration to the layman acting in his own defense. This 
requirement is endorsed by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, ^as 
wei1 as many other Feaeral case; which require a much iess 
stringent application of the rules to "pro se's". Malstrom 
raised adequate objections to all irrelevant testimony presented 
by the State at the trial. His objections were renewed at the 
proper time and ail of them are adequately preserved as issues on 
appeal. His inartfu1lness and lack of technical Knowledge does 
not stand against him. In all other ways he has met his 
obligations and the requirements of procedure. This Court has 
often realized that a "pro se" is to be allowed a little extra 
guidance from the Court, if such can be done without damaging tne 
8 
Court* s impartiality. 
There was not sufficient evidence of "Practicing Medicine 
without a License to convict defendant. 
According to the established law "Fenai statutes are within 
the operation of tne general rule that statues in pari materia 
should be construea together, Unaer this ruie. statutes in 
relation to the same offense must oe taken together ana construed 
as is the matters to wnich they relate were emoracea in a single 
statute," 75 Am Our 2d 305 (Statutes Section 505;. Aii of tne 
Utah Statutes relating to the practice of medicine with the 
definitions and exceptions therein, must be consiaered as part 
and parcel of U.C.A. 56-12-30 (Supp. 1986) which Maistrom was 
charged with violating. Therefore the definition of "Practicing 
Medicine", as found in U.C.A. 55-12-17 (1953) as amended: as well 
as those found in U.C.A. 55-12-36 (1953; as amendea. must be 
taken into account by the trial judge. Clearly, as Maistrom has 
previously argued, the State not only failed to prove some of tne 
elements of Practicing Medicine as found in those aefinitions, 
but further failed to present evidence of tnose and otner 
elements. The oniy evidence conclusively established, without 
contradictory testimony was that the Tishner's suggested that Ms. 
Marshall visit Maistrom due to complaints she had expressed to 
Tischners many times; that Maistrom, massaged her ana suggested 
she eat a more healthy diet, and drink a "green arinK" and take a 
"garlic enema," and that she visit her doctor. The Marshal Is' 
both testified that Maistrom had "twisted" Ms. Marshall's neck, 
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but the Tishners' both testified that he did not. Both Ms. 
Marshall and Mr. Marshall admitted that Malstrom did not 
^proscribe'1 drugs ror Ms. Marsnai, as required oy the statutory 
definition "Practicing Medicine" u n a the statutory aerinition of 
"proscribe";; but merely suggested a vegetable concoction caiied 
a "green drink," and vitamins. vT. 25, and 46) Both testified 
that Malstrom's so called "treatment" consisted of massage or 
accupressure iT. 23 and 46). Both testified that Maistrom aid 
not "hold himself out" as a doctor. (T 22 and 47;. Mr. Marshall, 
as well as Mrs. Tishner denied that Malstrom "diagnosed" Mrs. 
Marshall (T. 36 and 47; , Even Ms. Marshall's testimony that 
Maistrom said she had a "messed up pancreas" (T. 22) is a poor 
example of "diagnoses" as even the state defined it. (T. 50; Tne 
State railed to submit any evidence or maintaining an office or 
using a title implying that Malstrom was a doctor, or even that 
he ever said he was a doctor. 
it is oovious, that the statutes, when taKen in tneir 
entirety, cieariy define the actions wnich constitute the 
elements of practicing medicine without a license as; 
i. Diagnose. 
2. Treat. 
3. Suggest. 
4. Proscr ibe. 
5. Correct. 
6. Holding one's self out to be a doctor. 
7. Maintaining an office to do all of the aoove. 
and of course, 
6. Doing the aoove, without a license to do so. 
It is clear that the State failed to prove the majority of 
the elements. The Court even while recognizing the necessity to 
10 
examine ail of the elements, ana declaring Ms. Marshall as "the 
victim" disregarded the only testimony (Ms. Marshall's) 
concerning the contents of the "green drink." (T. 23). 
The State now argues that because the "green drink" was not 
harmrui has nothing to do with the element of "proscribe." 
However, the case law is clear: if an average person would have 
the articles in their home, a person can not be claimea to be 
proscribing them, and therefore, need not nave a license to 
recommena them. It would seem that the state does not believe 
the average person would have vegetables and gariic in tneir 
home, or that they would not know how to use a blender or enema 
bottle. In State v. liee Foo bun. 45 Utah 531, 147 p. 465, 491 
<1915). from whicn one or our definitions comes rrom, the 
Deiendant proscribed among other things ginseng, licorice and 
saspariila; such articles wouid not be common in the average 
person"s nome. 
The State rurther suggests that suggesting that Ms. Marshall 
had a "messed up pancreas" is the same as recognizing disease 
such as was done by Mr. Hoffman in State v. Horrman. 733 P.2d 
502, 505 (Utah 1987;, wherein the defendant told tne complainant 
that he was suffering from "chemical poisoning, and stomach 
ulcers:" which certainly claimed to clearly recognize tne CAUSE 
of the disease or problem. Nothing in Malstrom's actions or words 
even implied he knew what was wrong. Even when teliing Ms. 
Marshall Kit indeed he did) that she had a sinus inrection. did 
not imply he was certain of tne cause given the fact ne also told 
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her she should see her doctor to find out* 
Plaintiff was required to affirmatively prove that Defendant 
was outside the exceptions to the criminal statute, given his 
religious and other status in the community. 
The State contends that the exceptions to the penal statute 
are merely affirmative derenses which the derendant could 
utilize. This is not consistent with common principles of law. 
According to 73 Am Jur 2d.369-390. ^Statutes, Section 19l) 
"Hence, a statute should be construed in its entirety, and as a 
whcie. Ail parts or the act should be considered, ana construea 
together. It is not permissible to rest a construction on any one 
part aione." Thererore. not only must the Court take into 
consideration all of the different statutes which relate to the 
"practice or Medicine", but further, the Court must consider ail 
of the exceptions. It is clear that the effect of express 
exceptions to a penai statute is "that an exception in a statute 
amounts to an affirmation of the application of it's provisions 
to ail other cases not excepted, and excludes all other 
exceptions." 73 Am Jur 2d 466. (Statutes, Section 316). The 
state was required to affirmatively prove the exceptions did not 
apply. "More accurately, it may be said that such tpenalD laws 
are to be interpreted strictly against the state and liberally in 
favor of the accused. 73 Am Jur 2d 451, (Statutes, Section 293). 
Section UCA 58-12-30 is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
unci ear. 
it is obvious, as Maistrom previously argued, that U.C.A. 
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56-12-30, (1953) as amended, is on its race unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague. In the case of Logan City v. Huber, 785 
P.2d 1372 vUtah App. 1990 J, the Court struck down a city 
ordinance because it's language reached into constitutionally 
protected areas or behavior. The Court, in that case refused to 
apply the law to Huoer or any one else. The giving of free 
advise; as Maistrom did, is a constitutionally protected 
activity, under the First Amendment of the United Sates 
Constitution. And further, a person who gives a massage or other 
help when called upon to ao so, by the individual he helps, can 
not be held criminally liable without violating the same area of 
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of association, both for the 
accusea and the complainant. Ms. Marshall came to Maistrom, and 
asked for help, he did nothing but supply what neip ne could. 
For him to be held criminally liable is lucrative, and would 
indicate that any person who is asked to help another, (as 
examples previously submitted in Appellant's initial brier); 
should think twice before doing so. Should the chicken soup oe 
distasteful; should the business partner fail to straighten the 
back, both civil and criminal charges might ensue. 
The trial Court erred in allowing inflammatory, prejudicial, 
irrelevant testimony to be introduced against the defendant. 
The State argues that Paul Jacobson's ana Dr. Gaurin's 
testimony was relevant and admissible "to corroborate Mrs. 
Marshall's testimony." The State fails to recognize that all 
these witnesses corroborated was what Mrs. Marshall TOLD them. 
They had no personal knowledge concerning the actions of the 
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defendant-they were merely told. Even then all tney coniirmed 
was that Mrs, Marshall was experiencing recurring difficulties 
with the neck which she claimed Malstrom had. caused veven though 
she had been to see Jacoosen ror the very same prooiem prior to 
her visit to Malstrom) This is all third hand. Hearsay, 
inrormation wnich is not admissible, at ail, in a Court or law. 
The effect of their testimony served only to inflame the Court's 
sensibilities to consider Mrs. Marshall a "victim.11 The fact 
that she had visited Jacobsen; with the same complaint, prior to 
her visit with Malstrom was overlooked, by the Court, in it's 
sympathy for her. Had this not been the case, the Court wouid 
have recognized her O D V I O U S inconsistent testimony, ana wouid 
have put iess weight on it. Ms. Marshall and her husoand were 
obviously prejudiced u n a coached;; by the ract that a win in 
criminal court would aid their civil action. Taken together, trie 
testimony of these two witnesses, ano ail other testimony, failed 
to establish the elements of "practicing Medicine without a 
License:" but with the inflammatory nature or this purely 
irrelevant, hearsay testimony, the Court managed to have too much 
sympathy for Ms. Marshall, even to the extent of disregarding the 
inconsistencies between her testimony and Jacobsen's. her 
testimony ana her husband's, as well as the inconsistencies 
between her testimony and the Tishners'. 
CONCLUSION 
The State has grossly failed to prove it's case, ana merely 
14 
won because it took unfair advantage of Maistrom's technical 
inabilities. The State's attorney purposely inflamed the Court's 
sympathies through introduction of irrelevant testimony, to which 
Maistrom appropriately objected. The State did not conclusively 
prove the elements nor did it prove the exceptions did not appiy. 
it was only oy taking unrair advantage, that this conviction was 
obtained. Even Mr. Jones ^the State Attorney) admitted that he 
diet not think this was a serious case ^T. 51;. but nonetheless. 
he sought conviction. He got one-but he should never nave 
succeeded, given the facts of this case. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks this Court to reverse his 
conviction and return to him the monies he has already advanced 
in payment of the fine. 
Dated this 20th day of August, 1990. 
Respectfuliy submitted 
STANLEY HAL^TROM 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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